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Are there any practical weaknesses in RSA where the private key is used to encrypt a message (signing), without padding?

I came across this scenario recently and would like to understand if there are any practical attacks against this implementation.

An RSA private key is used to "encrypt" data. The public key is included in a software component distributed to users and is used to "decrypt" this data. I’m aware that this offers no confidentiality, however it does prevent the data being tampered with, as users have no access to the private key.

"Decryption" is done using the exponent and modulus extracted from the public key, and uses the Java ModPow function.

Given that the plaintext is known and no padding is used, are there any practical attacks which would allow the private key to be recovered, or for chosen plaintext to be "encrypted"?

Virtual Lightning channels for high availability

I’ve recently reread Rene Pickhardt’s draft proposal for Virtual Channels. One benefit of virtual channels, as I understand it, is that they would allow a single entity to run multiple nodes while leveraging the full capacity of all nodes (both inbound and outbound). This would be a possible way for entities to run a highly-available,::Listen

I’ve recently reread Rene Pickhardt’s draft proposal for Virtual Channels.

One benefit of virtual channels, as I understand it, is that they would allow a single entity to run multiple nodes while leveraging the full capacity of all nodes (both inbound and outbound). This would be a possible way for entities to run a highly-available, perhaps geographically distributed, cluster of nodes.

Did anything come of this idea? Are there other strategies for high availability which have gained more adoption?

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