CryptoFly.us | CRYPTOCURRENCY BITCOIN SHIRTS CLOTHING APPAREL HATS

CRYPTO NEWS

Bitcoin all-time highs ‘just a matter of time’ after a BTC ETF approval looks certain

Bitcoin’s price spiked above $61,800 as the promise of a BTC ETF approval reignited the discussion on whether the top-ranked cryptocurrency will hit $100,000 by the end of the year.

Efficient decoding of irreducible binary Goppa codes and the role of matrix P in McEliece cryptosystem

If we assume that the support for an irreducible binary Goppa code $gamma_1, …, gamma_n$ is publicly known, when is it possible to efficiently decode the code? I know it’s possible if one knows the generator polynomial $g(x)$, and also, if one can obtain a parity check matrix $H$ of the form $XYZ$, where $::Listen

If we assume that the support for an irreducible binary Goppa code $gamma_1, …, gamma_n$ is publicly known, when is it possible to efficiently decode the code? I know it’s possible if one knows the generator polynomial $g(x)$, and also, if one can obtain a parity check matrix $H$ of the form $XYZ$, where

$ X = left( begin{array}{cccc}
g_t & 0 & dots & 0 \
g_{t-1} & g_t & dots & 0 \
vdots & vdots & ddots & vdots \
g_1 & g_2 & dots & g_t \
end{array}right) $

$ Y = left( begin{array}{cccc}
1 & 1 & dots & 1 \
l_1 & l_2 & dots & l_n \
l_1^2 & l_2^2 & dots & l_n^2 \
vdots & vdots & ddots & vdots \
l_1^{t-1} & l_2^{t-1} & dots & l_n^{t-1} \
end{array}right) $

$ Z = left( begin{array}{cccc}
frac{1}{g(l_1)} & & & \
& frac{1}{g(l_2)} & & \
& & ddots & \
& & & frac{1}{g(l_n)} \
end{array}right) $

as in the paper by Engelbert, Overbeck and Schmidt (1, 2), since here we are able to recover a multiple of the matrix $X$ and so a multiple of g(x) which generates the same code. My question is, is it possible to efficiently decode the code whenever one knows ANY generator matrix or ANY parity check matrix for the binary irreducible Goppa code?

Also, on p.15, Sec. 3.1 of the Engelbert et al. paper an attacker is assumed to know a generator matrix $SG’$ for the Goppa code and a corresponding systematic check matrix $H’$. The attacker is then assumed to be able to recover matrices P an M such that $M^{-1}H’P^{-1}=H$ where $H=XYZ$ is of the above form (and thus, decode the code). Why is this assumption feasible? How would an attacker know at all when $H=XYZ$? Also, why should H generate the same subspace as H’?

Finally, the section 3.1 of the paper claims that if in a McEliece system with public code generator matrix $G=SG’P$ the matrix $P$ is revealed, then it is possible to recover $g(x)$. How? The only way I can think of it is that if $c$ is a codeword in a code generated by $SG’P$ then $cP^{-1}$ is a codeword in a Goppa code generated by $SG’$ and so the syndrome $S_{cP^{-1}}(x)=sum (cP^{-1})_i/(X-gamma_i)$ which the attacker can calculate is congruent to zero modulo $g(x)$. Is this a way to obtain $g(x)$?

Bitcoin all-time highs ‘just a matter of time’ after a BTC ETF approval looks certain

Shopping cart
There are no products in the cart!
Continue shopping
0