CRYPTO NEWS

Original

#Original #TheSupremeTeam
Artist Name: Original

Who are you?

Industrious recording and performing artist

Where are you from?

Ghana … music is our daily activities

How can we follow you?

Song Title: MaMuu

Listen to Original:

https://audiomack.com/zigi-diz/song/mamu

Source: https://supremepr.us/

Security of `M` AND `K`

With One-Time-Pads I have heard that it is preferential to use XOR because the ciphertext reveals no information about what the plaintext may have been (for each 0 and 1 of the ciphertext there is a 50% chance that the plaintext was a 0 or a 1). In contrast AND means that some information is::Listen

With One-Time-Pads I have heard that it is preferential to use XOR because the ciphertext reveals no information about what the plaintext may have been (for each 0 and 1 of the ciphertext there is a 50% chance that the plaintext was a 0 or a 1).

In contrast AND means that some information is revealed about the plaintext from the ciphertext (for each 1 in the ciphertext you can be sure there was a 1 in the plaintext). However, my question is if there is enough information revealed to genuinely be a security risk? For instance, take the following ciphertext:

c = 000100100011000010010000

Using this ciphertext an attacker could begin to predict some characteristics of the plaintext.

p = xxx1xx1xxx11xxxx1xx1xxxx

On average an attacker would be able to predict 25% of the plaintext immediately from observing the ciphertext. They also know that on average a third of the remaining plaintext is 1, and that the other two-thirds are 0 though they do not have any clues to begin to predict which are which from my knowledge.

Is there any attack that could be performed given the knowledge that each remaining bit has a 2/3 chance to be a 0? Perhaps an algorithm that would reduce the number of operations needed to predict the entirety of the plaintext? I would assume intuitively, but cannot quite conceptualise the maths involved, that on average you would only need to guess 1/3 of the remaining bits till you found the correct plaintext. Hence, a 256-bit size ciphertext would only need 2^64 ‘brute-force’ attempts before on average the correct plaintext was found.

Is there any attack that could be performed given the knowledge of on average 25% of the plaintext immediately, and each 1 in the plaintext? I would have assumed that there weren’t any attacks that could be performed given this knowledge. Though if most of ciphertext was 1 then this might begin to significantly reduce the number of ‘brute-force’ attempts needed.

Original

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