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Tether Experience DDOS Attack ! Here’s The Outlook at What Really Happened!

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The post Tether Experience DDOS Attack ! Here’s The Outlook at What Really Happened! appeared first on Coinpedia – Fintech & Cryptocurreny News Media| Crypto Guide

The most valuable stablecoin, USDT, has been the target of a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack. This is according to a tweet from Paolo Ardoino, Tether’s chief technical officer (CTO). The company has reportedly been assaulted before, according to the tweet from June 18.

 “They tried it once,” said Ardoino.

According to the Tether executive, the attackers sent a ransomware demand on June 18’s morning. A large-scale DDOS was caused by the company’s refusal to comply with the demands.

“We often receive 2k requests per five minutes on a typical day. The attack increased our demand to 8M in 5 minutes.”

Mitigation of The Attack

The main ASN that Cloudflare recognises is AS-CHOOPA, Ardoino continued, which made it possible for the attack to be mitigated. He also made it clear that Tether sustained no losses as a result of the attack.

Austin Federa, the head of communications at Solana, inquired as to whether 8 million requests made in less than a minute constitute a DDOS attack. A jump from 20,000 to 80,000 should be seen as an attack, in Ardoino’s opinion.

The CTO commented on what the attackers wanted to gain given that it wouldn’t affect the USDT chain

Imagine a journalist visiting http://tether.to and encountering error 502 on the page. They will fly right away.: The Tether Site Is Not Working! Told You

Proving equivalence of discrete logarithms over a modulus of unknown factorization

A prover has a secret exponent x, two public bases g and h, and a public RSA modulus N of which no party knows the totient/factors. All inputs other than N are caprice with N with overwhelming probability. She publishes a = g^x and b = h^x, but she needs an NIZK that she used::Listen

A prover has a secret exponent x, two public bases g and h, and a public RSA modulus N of which no party knows the totient/factors. All inputs other than N are caprice with N with overwhelming probability. She publishes a = g^x and b = h^x, but she needs an NIZK that she used the same exponent for both a and b. How can she create a proof (assuming access to randomness beacons and commitments)?

This is similar the problem solved by Schnorr’s proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm, but the difference is the RSA modulus, who’s factors are unknown and not guaranteed to be safe primes.

Tether Experience DDOS Attack ! Here’s The Outlook at What Really Happened!

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